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CASE COMMENT
DES and Emotional Distress: Payton v.
Abbott Labs
In Payton v. Abbott Labs, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held that no cause of action exists for negligently in-
flicted emotional distress absent physical harm. The author
analyzes Payton in relation to the historical development of
mental and emotional distress in the law of torts. The author
argues that the physical harm requirement is arbitrary and un-
reasonable and that it often precludes the litigation of serious
claims.
"If the plaintiff is to recover every time that her feelings are
hurt, we should all be in court twice a week."'
I. DES SPAWNS ADDITIONAL CLAIMS
Diethylstilbestrol (DES)" first appeared on the market as a
miscarriage preventative in 1947, and until 1971, physicians com-
monly prescribed the drug for millions of pregnant women.8 In
1971, medical studies identified DES as a possible cause of clear-
cell adenocarcinoma, a fast spreading and often fatal form of can-
1. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MiCH. L. Rv.
874, 877 (1939).
2. DES is a man-made compound of the female hormone estrogen. See 35 PvsicUNs'
DESK REFERENCE 1055 (1981).
3. See Weitzner & Hirsh, Diethylstilbestrol - Medicolegal Chronology, 1982 MD.
TRIAL TECH. Q. 145; Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46
FORDHAM L. REv. 963, 964 (1978).
4. See Greenwald, Barlow, Nasca & Burnett, Vaginal Cancer after Maternal Treat-
ment with Synthetic Estrogens, 285 NEw ENG. J. MED. 390, 390-92 (1971); Herbst, Ulfelder
& Proskanzer, Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina - Association of Maternal Stilbestrol Ther-
apy with Tumor Appearance in Young Women, 284 id. at 878 (1971). These studies
prompted congressional hearings, and in November 1971, the Food and Drug Administra-
tion contraindicated DES for use by pregnant women. "[I1n view of the fact that a statisti-
cally significant association has been demonstrated between the use of diethylstilbestrol in
early pregnancy and the occurrence of adenocarcinoma of the vagina in the offspring, this
drug .. . is contraindicated for use in pregnancy." 36 Fed. Reg. 21,537 (1971).
The drug, however, is still prescribed today. It is presently approved for use as an es-
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cer. This disease has attacked the reproductive organs of many
women whose mothers ingested DES." Research also linked DES to
adenosis, abnormal vaginal and cervical growths commonly found
in DES daughters.'
Many women exposed to DES before birth have filed suits
against the drug companies that produced the synthetic hormone.'
Those plaintiffs sought recovery for abnormalities of their repro-
ductive organs or clear-cell adenocarcinoma - physical conditions
which the plaintiffs alleged were the result of their mothers' inges-
tion of DES.8 Brenda Payton, representing a class of approxi-
mately 4,000 women,9 claimed no physical harm as a result of her
trogen replacement in cases of hormone deficiency; in therapy to prevent the incidence of
postoperative hemorrhage; in treatment of some cases of cancer; and for suppression of lac-
tation. 35 PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1055-57 (1981).
5. Medical researchers discovered that DES interferes with the formation of normal
genital tissue at a critical time in the development of the fetus. The earlier in pregnancy a
mother receives DES, the greater the chances are that her daughter will develop one of the
abnormalities associated with the drug. Herbst, Current Health Status of DES-Exposed
Mothers, Daughters and Sons, 29 CONSULTANT 234 (1980). Initially, researchers feared that
the incidence of adenocarcinoma in the daughters might be tragically high, but that fear has
not proven true. The risk is now set at about one in every 100,000 women, to age 24, who
were exposed to DES before birth. Hammond & McLaughlin, Judge Rules Mass. Women
May Sue Drug Firms over DES Risks, Boston Globe, Aug. 1, 1979, at 6, col. 1.
6. The Food and Drug Administration requires the following warning on DES, which is
still sold: "Vaginal adenosis has been reported in 30% to 90% of postpubertal girls and
young women whose mothers received diethylstilbestrol . . . during pregnancy . . . . The
significance of this finding with respect to potential for development of vaginal adenocarci-
noma is unknown. Periodic examination of such patients is recommended." 40 Fed. Reg.
32,773 (1975).
The Payton court characterized adenosis as "benign." Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386
Mass. 540, 542, 437 N.E.2d 171, 173 (1982). Another court described these growths as "pre-
cancerous." Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 588, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 133, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
7. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr.
730 (1978); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1980), aff'd, -
Mich. - . N.W.2d - (Feb. 6, 1984) (No. 64712); Lyons v. Premo Labs., 170 N.J.
Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J.
Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d
317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981).
8. For an analysis of the many complex hurdles that these DES daughters face, see
generally Abrahams & Musgrave, The DES Labyrinth, 33 S.C.L. Rev. 663, 663-71 (1982).
9. The class included all women: "1) who were exposed to diethylstilbestrol ("DES") in
utero; 2) whose exposure occurred in Massachusetts; 3) who were born in Massachusetts; 4)
who (were] domiciled in Massachusetts when they receive[d] notice of this action; and 5)
who have not developed uterine or vaginal cancer." Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382,
386 (D. Mass. 1979).
Not mentioned in the class action suit were DES sons, who have frequently been found
to suffer structural abnormalities in their reproductive tissue and to a lesser degree, sterility.
See generally Abrams, Genital and Semen Abnormalities in Adolescent Males Exposed to
[Vol. 37:151
PAYTON v. ABBOTT LABS
exposure to DES but alleged that she is "anxious and emotionally
upset"'10 over the possibility of developing clear-cell adenocarci-
noma in the future. She brought suit in federal district court in
Massachusetts" against Abbott Labs and five other DES manufac-
turers. 2 The district court, finding no controlling precedent, certi-
fied four questions of law to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court. The first question posed'" was whether Massachusetts rec-
ognized a right of action for negligently inflicted emotional distress
absent any evidence of physical harm. The supreme judicial court
responded in the negative, holding that even when emotional dis-
tress results from an increased statistical likelihood of contracting
serious disease in the future, no cause of action in negligence exists
absent any evidence of physical harm. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386
Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982).
Payton dealt with an issue that has troubled the judiciary for
many years: how to deal with claims for damages for emotional dis-
DES, J.C.A.M. (July, 1980).
10. 386 Mass. 540, 543, 437 N.E.2d 171, 173 (1982).
11. She sought six remedies on behalf of the class:
1) a declaratory judgment that the acts of the defendants in producing DES for
use by pregnant women to prevent miscarriages were wrongful and unlawful;
2) an injunction ordering the defendants to notify girls, women, and doctors of
facts about DES;
3) an injunction ordering the defendants to establish free clinics for examining
plaintiff class members;
4) an injunction forbidding "mass-market testing" of drugs by the defendants;
5) monetary judgments for compensatory and punitive damages; and
6) an injunction ordering the defendants to establish an insurance fund, or to
pay a sufficiently large sum, to compensate class members who might suffer later
from any cancer that DES has induced.
Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 389 n.3 (D. Mass. 1979).
12. The other defendants were Eli Lilly & Co., Merck & Co., Rexall Drug Co., E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., and Upjohn Co. 386 Mass. 540, 540 n.2, 437 N.E.2d 171, 171 n.2 (1982).
13. The other three certified questions were: 2) "If the trier of fact concludes that a
plaintiff would probably not have been born except for the mother's ingestion of DES, is
that plaintiff barred from recovery because of physical or emotional damage suffered as a
result of the mother's ingestion of DES?" The court answered yes. Id. at 557-60, 437 N.E.2d
at 181-2. 3) "Does Massachusetts recognize a right of action for injury to a plaintiff in utero
resulting from ingestion of a drug by her mother?" And if so, is such right of action to be
applied retroactively? The court answered yes. Id. at 564-70, 437 N.E.2d at 182-88.
4) Assuming that the evidence does not warrant a conclusion that the defen-
dants conspired together, or engaged in concerted action, or established safety
standards through a trade association, may the defendant manufacturers, who
probably supplied some of the DES ingested by the mothers of the plaintiff
class, be held liable to members of the plaintiff class when neither the plaintiffs
nor the defendants can identify which manufacturer's DES was ingested by
which mothers?
The court failed to give a ,definitive answer. Id. at 570-74, 437 N.E.2d at 188-90.
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tress.14 The courts "have recognized that mental or emotional dis-
tress can be both real and serious in some instances, while trivial,
evanescent, feigned, or imagined in others.'" The various methods
of treating these claims represent judicial attempts to separate
genuine claims from those that are fictitious.
II. THE IMPACT RULE
The impact rule' was the first attempt at making the desired
distinction. Under this rule, there could be no recovery for negli-
gently inflicted emotional distress17 unless a qualifying physical in-
jury or physical impact accompanied the distress."8
14. As early as 1348, courts struggled to recognize mental tranquility as an interest
worthy of legal protection. I de S et Ux v. W de S, 22 Edw. III, f. 99 pl. 60 (1348). Histori-
cally, mental distress was considered too intangible or speculative to be the basis of an inde-
pendent cause of action. See, e.g., Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316,
73 So. 205 (1916) (mental suffering is too "metaphysical" to be capable of measurement);
Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W. 1003 (1900) (mental distress alone is too remote);
see also Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L.
REv. 1033, 1033 (1936). However, these same courts would generally recognize mental
anguish as an element of damages when the plaintiff alleged an independent intentional
tort. See Prosser, supra note 1, at 880. Courts have also awarded damages in negligence
actions in which worry, humiliation or mental disturbances resulted from a bodily injury.
See F.V. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 1321-23 (1956). In these cases, recov-
ery for emotional distress was allowed as a claim "parasitic" to the independent "host"
claim. The intentional nature of the defendant's conduct or evidence of a contemporane-
ously inflicted physical injury provided a basis for the assumption that the claim for mental
distress was genuine. See C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
789-92 (1959) for a review of the classic cases in which parasitic claims for emotional harm
were allowed. See generally 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY (1906).
15. 386 Mass. at 553, 437 N.E.2d at 179.
16. The doctrine was first announced in England in Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas,
13 App. Cas. 222 (1888). Curiously, the rule was abandoned only thirteen years later in
Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669; not in time, however, to block the spawning of
the doctrine in this country.
17. Traditionally, courts have shown more willingness to grant recovery where the
mental suffering is intentionally inflicted than where it is the result of mere negligence. One
reason is the tendency of the courts to expand tort liability as the moral guilt of the defen-
dant increases. See Bauer, The Degree of Defendant's Fault as Affecting the Administra-
tion of the Law of Excessive Compensatory Damages, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 583 (1934); Bauer,
The Degree of Moral Fault as Affecting Defendant's Liability, 81 id. at 586 (1933). But
probably more important is the belief that in such intentional misconduct there is an ele-
ment of outrage, which guarantees that the resulting mental disturbance is serious and not
feigned. "It is the character of such conduct itself which provides the necessary assurance
that genuine harm has been done, and that it is so important as to be entitled to redress."
Prosser, supra note 1, at 879. But see infra Part V (discussion of third public policy argu-
ment against recovery).
18. Although the general rule was that no action would lie for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress in the absence of physical impact, there were exceptions. These excep-
tions involved cases where it was apparent from the particular circumstances that the harm
[Vol. 37:151
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The leading cases on the impact rule demonstrate its mechani-
cal nature. For example, in Spade v. Lynn & Boston Railroad Co.19
a train conductor threatened to throw a drunken passenger off a
crowded commuter car. Even though the plaintiff, after watching
the fight, suffered serious bodily harm as a result of her nervous
shock, the court refused to grant recovery without a contempora-
neously inflicted "injury to the person from without."2 0 An equally
harsh result was reached in Mitchell v. Rochester Railway. 1
There, the plaintiff was waiting to board the defendant's horse-
drawn trolley. As the trolley approached, the driver negligently
turned so close to the plaintiff that she was trapped between the
horses' heads when the team stopped. Although she was not
touched, the plaintiff was so frightened that she fainted and suf-
fered a miscarriage. The court denied relief 22
To overcome the harsh results of cases such as Spade and
Mitchell, the courts were sometimes willing to stretch the bounda-
ries of the term "impact" to include even the most trivial forms of
was genuine and serious. In one group of cases involving telegraph companies, emotional
distress resulting from the negligent transmission of a message (such as one announcing
death) was compensated even absent impact, because the message itself revealed the likeli-
hood of the emotional harm. Cf. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cleveland, 169 Ala. 131, 53 So.
80 (1910); Mentzer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Iowa 752, 62 N.W. 1 (1895); Nitka v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 149 Wis. 106, 135 N.W. 492 (1912). A second group of cases in-
volved the negligent mishandling of corpses. See Carey v. Lima, Salmon & Tully Mortuary,
168 Cal. App. 2d 42, 335 P.2d 181 (1959); Torres v. State, 34 Misc. 2d 488, 228 N.Y.S.2d
1005 (1962); Lott v. State, 32 Misc. 2d 296, 225 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1962). Courts recognized an
independent right of recovery because the emotional harm to close friends and relatives of
the deceased was clearly foreseeable. Thus, when there was some external assurance that the
claim was worthy of redress, recovery was allowed.
19. 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
20. Id. at 290, 47 N.E. at 89. The court admitted that the rule rested on considerations
of administrative convenience.
The exemption from liability for mere fright, terror, alarm, or anxiety does not
rest on the assumption that these do not constitute an actual injury. They do in
fact deprive one of enjoyment and of comfort, cause real suffering, and, to a
greater or less extent disqualify one for the time being from doing the duties of
life. ...
[ ..ITihe real reason for refusing damages sustained from mere fright must be
something different; and it probably rests on the ground that in practice it is
impossible satisfactorily to administer any other rule. The law must be adminis-
tered in the courts according to general rules.
Id. at 288, 47 N.E. at 88-89.
21. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
22. "[N]o recovery can be had for mere fright, but also. . . none can be had for injuries
which are the direct consequences of it." Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 354.
19821
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contact.2" In Zelinski v. Chimics"4 the plaintiff was involved in a
minor automobile accident. Although there was no bodily harm,
the court held that the "jostling" of the plaintiff in the automobile
was a "physical impact" and allowed recovery for the emotional
distress. Similarly, in Kenney v. Wong Len2 5 the plaintiff, a cus-
tomer at defendant's restaurant, ate some roast chicken dressing
that contained a dead mouse. Discovery of the mouse made the
plaintiff ill and a nervous shock resulted. The court granted recov-
ery; a mouse hair had touched the roof of the plaintiff's mouth.
Decisions under the impact rule were arbitrary and produced
harsh and often anomalous results. While courts sometimes
granted an overly generous award based on the most trivial con-
tact, serious emotional distress and the resulting physical harm
frequently went uncompensated because the negligent act that
caused the emotional distress failed to produce any impact. For
example, in Bosley v. Andrews2' the plaintiff became physically in-
capacitated after her neighbor's 1500-pound Hereford bull chased
her around her yard. Fortunately, she "was saved from a leaden-
footed toreador's end '27 when her dog diverted the bull. Neverthe-
less, the plaintiff was terrified and collapsed, suffering a heart at-
tack. The court refused to grant relief since there was no physical
contact. Similarly, in Sullivan v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc.'8 the
court denied recovery for severe emotional shock suffered after
drinking milk from a container in which the plaintiff discovered a
dead mouse. The court reasoned that the plaintiff was not harmed
physically by ingesting the milk containing the "fecal matter of the
mouse;" she was harmed solely as a result of her mental distur-
bance at seeing the mouse in her milk. Although the plaintiff's
mental distress was arguably real and serious, this court, unlike the
court in Kenney v. Wong Len, did not strain to find impact.
23. See, e.g., Cameron v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 182 Mass. 310, 65 N.E. 385
(1902) (impact found when a negligent blast frightened plaintiff, causing her to fall out of
her rocking chair); Porter v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (Sup. Ct.
1906) (dust in eyes found to be impact); Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869
(1930) (smoke inhaled by a child constituted impact). The Georgia Court of Appeals, how-
ever, reduced the whole matter to a complete absurdity by finding impact in Christy Bros.
Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928) (horse "evacuated his bowels" into
the plaintiff's lap).
24. 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961).
25. 81 N.H. 427, 128 A. 343 (1925).
26. 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958). This case was noted in 13 U. MIAMI L. REv. 370
(1959).
27. 393 Pa. at 171, 142 A.2d at 268 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
28. 341 Mass. 216, 168 N.E.2d 80 (1960).
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Inconsistent results such as Sullivan and Kenney led to gen-
eral dissatisfaction with the impact rule. Even courts that had
staunchly supported the impact rule eventually abandoned it."
Today, only Florida maintains a tenuous hold on this outdated
doctrine.30 In place of the impact rule, courts have adopted more
liberal theories of recovery. Some courts embraced the "zone of
danger" test; others applied general negligence concepts, requiring
only that the foreseeable plaintiff suffer physical harm as a result
of the negligently inflicted emotional distress.
III. ZONE OF DANGER RULE
The zone of danger test is now the majority viewpoint.' This
rule disregards the requirement of physical impact and instead de-
mands that the plaintiff be within the physical zone of danger cre-
ated by the defendant's negligent act. A plaintiff who has been
subjected to the risk of bodily injury and who, as a direct result,
suffers emotional distress has a cause of action.
29. See Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978) (overruling
Spade v. Lynn & B. R.R.); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1961) (overruling Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.); see also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS 332 (4th ed. 1971); Note, Negligently Caused Mental Distress: Should Recovery
be Allowed?, 13 S.D.L. REV. 402, 403 (1968).
30. The Florida authority is Gillian v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974), noted in 28
U. MIAMI L. REV. 705 (1974). Gillian was recently followed in Champion v. Gray, 420 So. 2d
348 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) where the Fifth District Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's
complaint alleging emotional distress but no impact was properly dismissed because "[o]nly
the Florida Supreme Court can overrule the 'impact rule' and we shall respect the rule until
our supreme court sees fit to change it." Id. at 349. The court expressed the view, however,
"that Florida should now align itself with the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions which
have abandoned the rule and condemn it as unjust and illogical." Id. at 350. The court,
therefore, certified the following question of law to the Florida Supreme Court: "Should
Florida abrogate the 'impact rule' and allow recovery for the physical consequences resulting
from mental or emotional stress caused by the defendant's negligence in the absence of
physical impact upon the plaintif?" Id. at 354.
Although urging abandonment of the impact rule, the wording of the certified question
suggests that the court advocates retaining a physical harm requirement, and is not necessa-
rily urging recovery for purely emotional distress suffered by a bystander. Ih Champion, the
plaintiff sued for the wrongful death of his wife, who allegedly collapsed and died after
discovering her dead daughter's body by the side of the road.
31. 26 PERS. INJ. NEWSLETTER 15 (1982). This position was adopted by the American
Law Institute in the Second Restatement of Torts:
(2) If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing
bodily harm to another otherwise than by subjecting him to fright, shock, or
other similar and immediate emotional disturbance, the fact that such harm re-
sults solely from the internal operation of fright or other emotional disturbance
does not protect the actor from liability.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (1965).
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Two cases illustrate the parameters of this rule. 2 In Whetham
v. Bismarck Hospitals' the plaintiff sought recovery for severe
emotional distress after witnessing a hospital employee negligently
drop her newborn baby. The court denied relief, holding that the
plaintiff was never physically threatened by the defendant's negli-
gent act. The court reasoned that the defendant owed no duty to
those outside the range of physical peril. 4 A contrary result was
reached in Niederman v. Brodsky.35 In that case, the plaintiff suf-
fered a heart attack after narrowly escaping the destructive path
cut by the defendant's negligently driven car.86 Because he alleged
that he was within the zone of danger and feared for his own
safety, the court held that the plaintiff had stated a prima facie
cause of action for the nervous shock and resulting harm he suf-
fered. Courts following the zone of danger rule explain that it pro-
duces reasonable results while still providing an additional element
of proof that the claim for mental distress is real. The imposition
of liability is regarded as justifiable because the defendant created
a foreseeable risk of bodily injury to those within the zone of dan-
ger.3 7 That the plaintiff's bodily harm results from mental distress,
32. Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Niederman v. Brodsky,
436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970) (overruling Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263
(1958)); see also Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554
(1969) (mother, not in position to fear for her own safety, denied recovery after witnessing
injury to her child); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935) (no wrongful
death action available for mother who looked out of the window and saw her child negli-
gently killed on the highway).
33. 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972).
34. The court seemed to follow the majority view of Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248
N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), in recognizing that negligence is a relative term. It was not
enough that the defendant's conduct was negligent toward Mrs. Whetham's child; the de-
fendant's conduct would also have to have been negligent with respect to the legally pro-
tected interests of Mrs. Whetham. To impose liability in Whetham, it would have been
necessary to predicate a duty of care to carry an infant so as to avoid an unreasonable risk
of emotional distress to others outside the zone of physical danger. The court decided that
such predication would unreasonably enlarge the extent of the duty of care. See Note, The
Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: The Scope of Duty and Foreseeability of Injury, 57
N.D.L. REV. 577 (1981).
35. 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970) (overruling Bosley v. Andrews). Accord Mitnick v.
Whalen Bros., Inc., 115 Conn. 650, 163 A. 414 (1932) (plaintiff frightened by oncoming
automobile).
36. According to the plaintiff's complaint, the defendant's car "skidded onto the side-
walk and destroyed or struck down a fire hydrant, a litter pole and basket, a newsstand, and
[plaintiff's] son, who at that time was standing next to [plaintiff]." 436 Pa. at 401, 261 A.2d
at 84.
37. This rationale was clarified in Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [19251 1 K.B. 141, both by
Bankes, L.J., id. at 151, and by Atkin, L.J., id. at 156-59. See also Magruder, supra note 14,
at 1035-39.
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and not from impact, does not preclude liability. Some courts,
however, view the rule as inadequate because a strict application of
the doctrine would prevent recovery in cases when recovery should
not be denied." These courts would extend the rule to allow recov-
ery regardless of whether the plaintiff was in the zone of danger.
IV. NEITHER PHYSICAL IMPACT NOR ZONE OF DANGER
The first American court to allow another basis for recovery
was the Texas Supreme Court in Hill v. Kimball. 9 There, the
court repudiated the requirement of impact and regarded the
physical consequences of the mental distress as a sufficient guaran-
tee that the claim was real.40 In Hill the plaintiff alleged that she
sustained emotional distress leading to a miscarriage after she wit-
nessed her landlord violently assault two men in her yard. The
court stated: "It may be [very] difficult to prove the connection
between the alleged cause and the injury, but if it be proved, and
the injury be the proximate result of the cause, we cannot say that
a recovery should not be had.""'
This approach treats the claim of negligent infliction of mental
distress from an ordinary negligence standpoint without the zone
of danger limitation. It recognizes a duty to avoid a foreseeable,
unreasonable risk of emotional harm to another. If breach of this
duty proximately causes bodily harm, the defendant is liable.
Courts adhering to this rule do not require a plaintiff to prove di-
rect physical impact, nor do they require that the plaintiff be
within the physical zone of danger. Instead, these courts hold
that a plaintiff states a cause of action when he alleges that the
negligently inflicted mental distress was foreseeable and that it re-
sulted in bodily harm.
Massachusetts was one of the first jurisdictions to reject the
38. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
39. 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890). Accord Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134,
50 N.W. 1034 (1892) (fright causing nervous convulsions and illness compensable); Colla v.
Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957) (physical injury resulting directly from ex-
treme fright compensable). Contra Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 249
P.2d 843 (1952) (loss of sleep and severe emotional distress from receiving wrong baby not
compensable).
40. The court noted: "Probably an action will not lie when there is no injury except the
suffering of the fright itself; but such is not the present case." 76 Tex. at 215, 13 S.W. at 59.
41. Id.
42. In Hill v. Kimball the plaintiff would not have recovered had the court applied the
zone of danger test because she was never physically threatened by the landlord's negligent
conduct.
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zone of danger rule in favor of this more liberal approach.'3 In Dzi-
okonski v. Babineau" the plaintiff suffered severe emotional dis-
tress after she witnessed her daughter lying injured on a street.'5
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court overruled the impact
doctrine and held that the plaintiff stated a compensable claim for
the negligent infliction of emotional distress even though she was
not within the zone of danger. The court stated that although the
zone of danger rule produces more reasonable results than does the
impact rule, it is nonetheless inadequate because it does not recog-
nize the reasonable foreseeability of an injury to those outside the
physical zone of danger. 41 Reasonable foreseeability, explained the
court, is the proper starting point in deciding whether a negligent
act leads to liability.
Thus, Dziokonski expanded the notion of duty beyond the
zone of danger of direct harm to the zone of foreseeable risk of
harm. Unlike the zone of danger rule, which limits liability to an
absolute physical area, the zone of risk rule is based on the tradi-
tional negligence concept of foreseeability. A growing minority of
courts view this approach as the better one.'7
43. Three states had previously rejected the zone of danger rule. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.
2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758
(1974); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975).
44. 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978).
45. The facts of this case are particularly tragic. An automobile hit the plaintiff's child
as she was crossing a street. The plaintiff went to the scene of the accident and saw her
daughter lying injured on the ground. The mother suffered emotional shock after seeing the
child's injury and died while riding in the ambulance that was taking her daughter to the
hospital. The complaint also alleged that the father suffered emotional distress as a result of
the injury to his daughter and the death of his wife, and he also died. Id. at 557, 380 N.E.2d
at 1296.
46. In Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1965), the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that a mother, outside the zone of danger, stated a prima facie
cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. The mother had allegedly
suffered severe emotional distress and resulting bodily harm after watching a negligently
driven car "roll over" her daughter Erin.
Erin's sister also witnessed the collision. Although the mother and sister were within a
few yards of each other, only the sister happened to be within the zone of danger. The court
noted:
The case thus illustrates the fallacy of the rule that would deny recovery in the
one situation and grant it in the other. . . . [W]e can hardly justify relief to the
sister for trauma which she suffered upon apprehension of the child's death and
yet deny it to the mother merely because of a happenstance that the sister was
some few yards closer to the accident. The instant case exposes the hopeless
artificiality of the zone-of-danger rule.
Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
47. See cases cited supra note 43. Additional state courts applying the foreseeability
test include: Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Culbert v. Sampson's Super-
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The courts have been inconsistent in attempting to resolve the
public policy problems inherent in mental distress cases. The im-
pact rule has been universally condemned as unfair and illogical.
The zone of danger rule, while still the majority viewpoint, is the
subject of much criticism. The emergence of the zone of foresee-
able risk test indicates that some courts are now willing to aban-
don the earlier, more restrictive tests in determining liability. The
Dziokonski approach abrogated one of the arbitrary limitations on
recovery,"8 but retained another - the bodily harm requirement."9
Fear of fraudulent claims and a desire to limit the scope of liability
may have produced this compromise. Regardless of the reasons for
the requirement,"0 the Dziokonski court distinguished emotional
distress manifested by physical injury and emotional distress ab-
sent physical manifestations. This distinction prevented recovery
in Payton v. Abbott Labs.
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Payton held that no cause of action exists for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress absent any evidence of physical
harm.51 The majority's opinion focused on three public policy con-
markets Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d
140 (1973); Fournell v. Usher Pest Control Co., 208 Neb. 684, 305 N.W.2d 605 (1981); Corso
v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521
(1980); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979); and Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d
486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
48. See 30 MERCER L. REV. 735, 744 (1979).
49. "The only real requirement, however, which policy and justice dictate, is stringent
evidence of causation and of actual injury to deter those who would use a sound and just
rule as a cover for spurious claims." Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 620-21, 249 N.E.2d
419, 425, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 563 (1969) (Keating, J., dissenting).
50. The courts are now divided regarding the requirement of physical harm, or at least
physical symptoms, accompanying the mental distress. No physical harm was required in
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980)
(where tortious conduct directed toward plaintiff, no physical injury from emotional distress
required), in Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982) (bystander
may recover damages for serious mental distress without physical manifestations), or in
Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982) (parents allowed emotional distress damages
for "wrongful birth" of their child). Contra Plummer v. Abbott Labs., No. 80-0556 (D.R.I.
July 1, 1983), DES Litigation Rep. 3402 (July 26, 1983) (psychic injury which is neither
caused by some physical impact nor results in physical harm is not compensable); Fournell
v. Usher Pest Control Co., 208 Neb. 684, 305 N.W.2d 605 (1981) (no liability for conduct
resulting in emotional disturbance absent bodily harm); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406
A.2d 300 (1979) (parents who witness serious injury to their child may recover if their
mental and emotional harm is accompanied by objective physical symptoms).
51. Alternatively, if bodily harm results directly from the mother's ingestion of the
DES, parasitic damages for the mental distress would be recoverable. See supra note 14.
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cepts which courts have traditionally weighed against recovery in
mental distress cases: (1) fear of a flood of litigation; (2) fear of
fictitious claims; and (3) reluctance to subject a defendant to liabil-
ity for mental distress when he was merely negligent.2
The fear of a flood of litigation is based on an expected in-
crease in actions of a trivial nature coupled with an increase in
fraudulent claims. The court explained: "It is in recognition of the
tricks that the human mind can play upon itself, as much as of the
deception that people are capable of perpetrating. . . that we con-
tinue to rely upon traditional indicia of harm to provide objective
evidence that a plaintiff actually has suffered emotional distress. ' 53
Previously, the fear that a flood of litigation would ensue had
been advanced in support of the impact requirement.54 This argu-
ment has two weaknesses. First, those courts that have relaxed the
impact rule have not experienced any substantial increase in litiga-
tion.55 Second, courts should not refuse to adjudicate a particular
type of case simply because their docket may increase. 6 A court's
duty is to remedy legal wrongs "even at the expense of a 'flood of
litigation;' and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the
part of any court of justice to deny relief upon the ground that it
will give the court too much work to do."51 7
The second public policy concept - fear of fraudulent claims
- also should not limit recovery. This fear has always troubled the
52. See 386 Mass. at 552-53, 437 N.E.2d at 178-79.
53. Id. at 547, 437 N.E.2d at 175.
54. Impact, it was thought, would guarantee that the plaintiff's mental distress was
real. See, e.g., Brody, Negligently Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 VLL. L.
Rzv. 232, 233-34 (1962); cf. Herrick v. Evening Express Publishing Co., 120 Me. 138, 140,
113 A. 16, 17 (1921) ("[Ilf no'bodily injury is alleged or proved, there can be no premise
upon which to base a conclusion of mental suffering."); Huston v. Borough of Freemansburg,
212 Pa. 548, 550, 61 A. 1022, 1023 (1905) (mental distress unaccompanied by impact is "so
intangible, so untrustworthy, so illusory, and so speculative a cause of action" that it would
be disastrous to grant recovery).
55. See, e.g., Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 405, 165 N.W.2d 259, 263
(1969) (no indication of a flood of litigation or rash of fraudulent claims); Lambert, Tort
Liability for Psychic Injuries, 41 B.U.L. REv. 584, 592 (1961) ("The truth of the matter is
that the feared flood tide of litigation has simply not appeared . . ").
56. See Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314, 315 (D. Colo. 1965); Green v. Shoe-
maker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 81, 73 A. 688, 692 (1909); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 241-42,
176 N.E.2d 729, 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 38 (1961). The California Supreme Court in Dillon v.
Legg stated, "Courts not only compromise their basic responsibility to decide the merits of
each case individually but destroy the public's confidence in them by using the broad broom
of 'administrative convenience' to sweep away a class of claims a number of which are ad-
mittedly meritorious." 68 Cal. 2d at 737, 441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
57. Prosser, supra note 1, at 877.
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judiciary,58 but now, because of the recent advances in psychiatric
and psychological knowledge, there is no longer any justification
for denying recovery for purely emotional injuries."' Therefore,
courts can no longer legitimately deny recovery on the strength of
precedent that points to the difficulty of distinguishing between
serious and fraudulent mental distress.
In fact, the argument that a jury may be unable to distinguish
between a legitimate claim and a fictitious claim is a spurious one
which can be advanced in any situation. The Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court recognized this, and seven years before Pay-
ton the court dismissed the notion that tort liability in particular
classes of cases should be denied because of the threat of fraud. In
Sorenson v. Sorenson6 ° the court stated that it would be a sad ex-
pression of incompetence "if we were to admit that the judicial
processes are so ineffective that we must deny relief to a person
otherwise entitled because in some future case a litigant may be
guilty of fraud or collusion. Once that concept were accepted then
all causes of action should be abolished."'"
In Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., e2 a 1976 case mentioned only
briefly in Payton," the court rejected this same argument:
That some claims may be spurious should not compel those who
administer justice to shut their eyes to serious wrongs and let
them go without being brought to account. It is the function of
courts and juries to determine whether claims are valid or false.
This responsibility should not be shunned merely because the
58. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
59. In Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 405-06, 261 A.2d 84, 86 (1970), the court
noted, "New equipment and research, improved education and diagnostic techniques, and
an increased professional understanding of disease in general require us now to give greater
credit to medical evidence." No longer are the effects of hyperemotional states of the human
body shrouded in mystery or myth.
60. 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975).
61. Id. at 365 n.19, 339 N.E.2d at 915-16 n.19 (quoting Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914,
920, 479 P.2d 648, 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 292 (1971), quoting Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692,
696, 376 P.2d 70, 73, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 105 (1962)).
Perhaps the most stinging attack on the position is found in Judge Musmanno's force-
ful dissent to a decision based on the impact requirement.
But are our courts so naive, are they so gullible, are they so devoid of worldly
knowledge, are they so childlike in their approach to realities that they can be
deceived and hoodwinked by claims that have no factual, medical, or legalistic
basis? If they are, then all our proud boasts of the worthiness of our judicial
system are empty and vapid indeed.
Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 175, 142 A.2d 263, 270 (1958) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
62. 370 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976).
63. 386 Mass. at 550, 554-56, 437 N.E.2d at 177, 179-80.
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task may be difficult to perform.""
For reasons not specified, the Payton court ignored its own reason-
ing in Agis and Sorenson and resurrected the "fear of fictitious
claims" argument.
The third public policy concept the court discussed is that
where the defendant's conduct is negligent, not intentional, he
should not be held liable for a purely mental disturbance. This
concept is rooted in the misguided belief that the reckless or inten-
tional nature of a defendant's conduct permits a jury to infer that
the plaintiff suffered genuine emotional distress. But the degree of
the defendant's fault bears no relation to the genuineness of a
claim for damages for emotional distress. In a well-reasoned dis-
sent, Judge Wilkins pointed out that the defendant's extreme be-
havior should be the basis for recovery rather than the basis for
inferring genuine emotional distress."5
Yet, it was for these three rather unpersuasive policy reasons
that the court in Payton upheld the Dziokonski distinction be-
tween emotional distress manifested by physical injury and emo-
tional distress absent physical manifestations. 6 This distinction
suffers from two serious flaws. First, it assumes that emotional dis-
tress without physical manifestations is likely to be trivial.7 This
assumption is incorrect. Because of the subjective nature of anxi-
ety reactions, precise levels of suffering and disability cannot be
objectively determined." Relatively mild emotional distress may
result in bodily harm to one person, while extremely severe mental
trauma may not produce any physical manifestations in another.
There is no legal justification based on medical knowledge for
prohibiting all plaintiffs from attempting to prove that their inju-
64. 370 Mass. at 143-44, 355 N.E.2d at 318 (quoting Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 290,
293, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (1961)). Accord George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 268
N.E.2d 915 (1971) (the soundness of this argument should not prevail against logic and
justice); Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967) (courts can
face the possibility of fraudulent claims as in other types of cases).
65. 386 Mass. at 578, 437 N.E.2d at 193 (Wilkins, J., dissenting). Judges Liacos and
Abrams joined Judge Wilkins in dissenting to the answer to certified question one.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
67. 386 Mass. at 552, 437 N.E.2d at 178 ("emotional disturbance which is not so severe
or serious as to have physical consequences is likely to be so temporary, so evanescent and
so relatively harmless").
68. See generally Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability
for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193 (1944). "Our purpose . . . has been to show the
scientific error in assuming that psychic stimuli cannot cause injury. The reader must real-
ize, on the other hand, that we do not say that injury is an invariable or even a frequent
consequence." Id. at 225.
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ries are real.
The second drawback to the Dziokonski distinction is that it
actually clouds the real issue. The essential question in any mental
distress case is one of proof: whether on the facts presented, the
plaintiff has suffered a serious and compensable injury. This is a
question of fact for the jury. Jurors, by referring to their own ex-
periences, are best able to determine whether the defendant's con-
duct has resulted in emotional distress and whether the plaintiff is
entitled to compensation. 9 When the judge reads the complaint to
determine whether there was a resulting physical injury, he is in-
vading the province of the jury.70
The physical harm requirement is simultaneously overinclu-
sive and underinclusive. It is overinclusive because it permits re-
covery for mental distress when the physical harm is trivial. It is
underinclusive because it prevents the litigation of valid claims. In
addition to these faults, the physical harm requirement fails to
serve its intended purpose - it does not prevent the litigation of
fraudulent claims. This shortcoming is illustrated by the simple
suggestion that those capable of perjuring evidence in the first in-
stance will not hesitate to fabricate a slight injury to insure recov-
ery. In short, the physical harm requirement is arbitrary and
unreliable. 1
Courts have long feared that compensating the loss of mental
tranquility would too often result in undeserved liability.72 The
Payton court hoped to lessen this fear by distinguishing between
serious and trivial mental distress based upon the presence or ab-
sence of physical harm. However, the majority was so anxious to
uphold its convenient distinction that they did not bother to ex-
amine what effect their decision would have on the 4,000 plaintiffs.
It is questionable whether Judge Lynch, writing for the court, ever
studied the factual circumstances that led to the certified question.
The court summarily dismissed an entire class of claims as trivial
69. See State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952).
70. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 927, 616 P.2d 813, 821, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831, 839 (1980).
71. See Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, 47 Wis. 2d 220, 177 N.W.2d 83 (1970).
72. This is not necessarily true. See Reaves, Fear Not Enough: Noncancer DES Case
Fails, 69 A.B.A. J. 725 (1983) (discussing Mink v. University of Chicago). Mink was one of
the first noncancer cases to go to trial. In Mink, the plaintiff claimed no physical harm as a
result of her exposure to DES but tried to convince the jury that she was entitled to dam-
ages because she has had to endure extreme mental suffering and fear over the possibility
that she will some day be a cancer victim. The defendants contended that nothing was
wrong with the plaintiff and that her fear of cancer should not be grounds for awarding
damages. The jury agreed.
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when the claims could have easily been viewed as legitimate. 8
Surely, the facts warranted a jury determination of the reasonable-
ness of the plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress. A rule that
would dismiss as trivial emotional distress without resulting physi-
cal injury before there is a jury determination is not a fair one.
In dissent, Judge Wilkins argued that emotional distress is not
always trivial. He remarked that emotional distress may result
from any number of circumstances.
It may be the product of a reasonable concern about one's in-
creased prospect of contracting a fatal disease, which may be
treatable only by radical surgery or radiation. It may be the re-
sult of concern over the expenses, reasonably to be incurred, in
submitting to medical examinations. While, on the facts given to
us, I cannot declare with certainty that each plaintiff considered
in question one may recover for the consequences of her emo-
tional distress, it appears that at least some of the plaintiffs may
be able to demonstrate emotional distress of more than a trivial
nature."'
The fact that most jurisdictions would not have granted relief ab-
sent physical harm does not condone adherence to an illogical and
oftentimes unjust rule of law.75 As Judge Wilkins noted, "The iner-
tia which results from reliance on a 'majority view' guarantees a
glacial development of the law. ''7' Even earlier, Judge Musmanno
stated, "A precedent can not, and should not, control, if its
strength depends alone on the fact that it is old, but may crumble
at the slightest probing touch of instinctive reason and natural
justice. 7 7
The arguments in support of the physical injury requirement
are old and have crumbled in other jurisdictions. 8 Yet the Payton
court upheld its former rule of law. The dissent, however, had the
better argument; in this case the plaintiffs' claims should have
been submitted to a jury, although there was no allegation of phys-
ical harm. Because the plaintiffs were exposed to DES, "good med-
ical practice requires interference with the[ir] normal lives. 7 9 The
73. See infra text accompanying notes 79-82.
74. 386 Mass. at 579-80, 437 N.E.2d at 193 (Wilkins, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 546, 437 N.E.2d at 175 (collecting cases).
76. Id. at 581, 437 N.E.2d at 194 (Wilkins, J., dissenting).
77. Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 183, 142 A.2d 263, 274 (1958) (Musmanno, J.,
dissenting).
78. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1980); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982).
79. 386 Mass. at 581, 437 N.E.2d at 194 (Wilkins, J., dissenting).
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dissent recognized that "[t]he time devoted to medical tests affects
the plaintiffs' earning power, and the expense of the testing affects
their pocketbooks."80 The plaintiffs' concerns are not trivial, eva-
nescent, or feigned. It is apparent from the factual circumstances
that the alleged emotional harm is genuine and serious.81 "These
circumstances present, in the words of the majority, although they
do not perceive it, an 'objective corroboration of the emotional dis-
tress alleged.' "82
Admittedly, the court was very concerned with "objective cor-
roboration" and the traditional fears of granting recovery for emo-
tional distress. 83 It would seem, however, that the real reason for
denying relief rested on some other ground, not articulated by the
court. This ground was probably the fear that, once the rigid lines
drawn by the artificial restrictions are erased, a defendant might
be susceptible to unlimited liability.8 4 This fear is one of the moti-
vating forces behind the various limiting doctrines in other
jurisdictions."'
VI. CONCLUSION
The possibility of unlimited liability is a legitimate concern,"
80. Id.
81. See supra note 18.
82. 386 Mass. at 579, 437 N.E.2d at 192 (Wilkins, J., dissenting).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
84. As Judge Breitel noted, "Every injury has ramifying consequences, like the rip-
plings of the waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences
of wrongs to a controllable degree." Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 619, 249 N.E.2d 419,
424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1969).
"Practically, not every loss can be made compensable in money damages, and legal cau-
sation must terminate somewhere. In delineating the extent of a tortfeasor's responsibility
for damages ... the courts must locate the line between liability and non-liability at some
point, a decision which is essentially political." Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 746,
120 Cal. Rptr. 110, 111-12 (1975).
85. See, e.g., Cosgrove v. Beymer, 244 F. Supp. 824 (D. Del. 1965) (compensating
mental distress would burden the courts and the defendants); Arnett v. Dow Chem. Co., SF
Master File No. 729586 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 21, 1983) (memorandum decision in sup-
port of orders regarding fear of cancer and risk of cancer) ("[T]he spectre of unlimited
liability from an army of plaintiffs parading their tumescent fears into the courtroom sup-
ported by a corps of psychiatrists has resulted in proper judicial restraint in this area." Id.
at 19).
The French philosopher Montaigne seemed to predict this widespread concern in his
essay on fear. He wrote: "There is no passion so contagious as fear." M. DE MONTAGoE, Of
Fear in THE ESSAYS OF MICHEL DR MONTAIGNE 62 (C. Cotton trans. 1892).
86. Unlimited liability could bankrupt an entire industry. Large judgments could re-
duce funds needed for research and development, prohibiting new and possibly effective
products from being developed. An overly cautious company might elect not to distribute an
extremely effective product because it fears that the product might not be completely safe.
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but even this possibility must be balanced against the interest of
the injured plaintiff. The law should not seek to provide a remedy
every time a plaintiffs feelings are hurt."' Conversely, the honest
plaintiff should not be denied relief for a foreseeable injury that
was negligently caused by another.8 8
The evolution in the area of negligently inflicted mental dis-
tress indicates a growing willingness to abandon unnecessarily re-
strictive tests in assessing liability." Courts that have abandoned
these arbitrary rules have found that traditional principles of duty,
foreseeability, and proximate cause are sufficient to resolve the ju-
dicial fears inherent in mental distress cases.9 0 Although there are
difficult problems of proof involved, these are neither insurmount-
able nor unique to mental distress cases and should not prevent a
plaintiff from presenting her case in court.
It therefore seems likely that the liberal trend will continue
and that even Massachusetts will one day abandon the physical
harm requirement. But until that day, it is unfortunate that the
courts continue to deny women like Brenda Payton the opportu-
nity to litigate their claims.
GARY S. GLICKMAN
87. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 39-47. The rationale for imposing liability on
the negligent manufacturer is multifaceted. The public has the right to expect a manufac-
turer to stand behind the safety of its product. This right is a consequence of the manufac-
turer's superior knowledge of its product's qualities and capabilities. Due to the complexity
of products, consumers are no longer able to protect themselves. Sellers are often in a better
position than injured consumers to internalize the cost of insuring the public's safety
through production efficiency and higher prices. In short, the manufacturer can treat the
burdens of product liability law as a cost of doing business. See Owen, Rethinking the Poli-
cies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 681, 684-85 (1980).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
90. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
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